Safety Report Narrative:

Pushed back from the gate, #1 engine started normal, #2 engine started but we received a IDG LO PRESS ECAM msg. Talked to Maintenance Control and as per their direction attempted another start on the #2 engine with the same ECAM msg.
Returned to the gate, met by contract Maintenance, they checked and saw the integrated drive generator (IDG) oil reservoir was very low and upon further inspection noted there was a contaminant in the reservoir that they determined was red colored hydraulic fluid. The First Officer suggested that we check the #1 engine IDG reservoir as well
Out of an abundance of caution I agreed and was shocked when the mechanics reported the reservoir was also contaminated with clearly not IDG OIL but a red hydraulic liquid. Visually checked it myself and took pictures. Discussimg it with Maintenance Control they determined the best course of action was to MEL the IDG on the #2 engine and have mechanics fly in and flush the #1 IDG reservoir on an overnight trip. The crew and I returned to the hotel for a XA:00 departure. The following day back on the flight deck reviewing the logbook we saw that MEL X was applied and signed of on the #2 engine. Upon further inspection we found the steps needed to be taken to apply the MEL, none of which were completed. After discussing the egregious mistake with Maintenance Control maintenance operations manager we did a engine run and with contract Maintenance in the flight deck and had them run procedures to manually disconnect the IDG on the #2 engine. Then I had them go out and redo all the steps required by the MEL including rechecking the APU oil level. During the engine run we received a #1 center tank lo press ECAM which I wrote up in the logbook. That write up was balanced by contract Maintenance; at the direction of Maintenance Control, with a reference to A-321 ACT guidance of less than 200 lbs of fuel in the ACT´s. I reached out to the maintenance operations manager again and pointed this out, he agreed I re wrote up the ECAM and balanced it using the flight crew placarding procedures. The issue with the #1 IDG was rectified with a flush of the reservoir, changing all the filters and seals, sending the contami liquid from the reservoir for chemical analysis and using a engineering authorization (EA) for a one time revenue flight back to base to finish any required maintenance procedures.Cause: Not sure how such a breakdown of the safety management system can possibly occur at a tenured airline. I´m still shocked that both reservoirs could be serviced with anything other than required IDG oil. Also the issue with having a MEL X on the aircraft as balanced and steps completed all the while none were completed, not even required placards such as MAX ALT 330, is deeply concerning. Add to this the issue with the center fuel pump write up, balanced using guidance from a different aircraft type, glaringly shows problematic issues with current procedures. I can understand minor issues and mistakes but this event is indicative of systemic problems that need to be addressed as soon as possibleincluded a picture I took of the #1 IDG reservoir clearly showing the a deep red liquid; clearly not the required oil.

GALIOT AI Generated Output - Issue #1

Problem Statement: Maintenance personnel serviced the Integrated Drive Generator (IDG) oil reservoirs on both the #1 and #2 engines with red hydraulic fluid instead of the required IDG oil. This contamination caused the #2 IDG to trigger a low-pressure warning and necessitated a complete flush and filter change for the #1 IDG.

Human Failure (Primary Cause): AE102 - Procedure or Checklist Not Followed Correctly
Key Precondition: PC101 - Inattention
Critical Event:Engineering/Maintenance - ATA 12 Servicing, Servicing Error - Wrong fluid type
Actual Consequence:>Operational Effects, Return to Stand due to Technical reason
Potential Consequence:Immediate Effects, Engine Inflight Shutdown
Supporting Statement Statement:
Contract Maintenance... noted there was a contaminant in the reservoir that they determined was red colored hydraulic fluid... mechanics reported the [ #1] reservoir was also contaminated with clearly not IDG OIL but a red hydraulic liquid.

GALIOT AI Generated Output - Issue #2

Problem Statement: Contract maintenance attempted to address a center fuel tank low-pressure message using technical guidance for an A321 aircraft, which was incorrect for the specific aircraft type being serviced. This required the flight crew to intervene and request the use of the correct placarding procedures.

Human Failure (Primary Cause):AE102 - Procedure or Checklist Not Followed Correctly
Key Precondition: PT104 - Lack of Proficiency/Experience
Critical Event:Engineering/Maintenance - Maintenance Program Management, Continuing Airworthiness Management - Unapproved data
Actual Consequence:>Operational Effects, Maintenance Action
Potential Consequence:Regulatory, Loss or suspension of AOC.
Supporting Statement Statement:
That write up was balanced by contract Maintenance... with a reference to A-321 ACT guidance
of less than 200 lbs of fuel in the ACT´s. I reached out to the maintenance operations manager again and pointed this out... I re wrote up the ECAM and balanced it using the flight crew placarding procedures.

GALIOT AI Generated Output - Issue #3

Problem Statement: Contract maintenance personnel applied and signed off a Minimum Equipment List (MEL) deferral for the #2 engine IDG without performing the required maintenance actions, such as manually disconnecting the IDG. This falsification of maintenance records left the aircraft in a non-compliant and unsafe state.

Human Failure (Primary Cause):AD003 - Extreme Lack of Discipline (Indiscipline)
Key Precondition: PC209 - Pressing, Haste, Motivation
Critical Event:Engineering/Maintenance - Maintenance Program Management, Vendor Error - Task not carried Out (vendor)
Actual Consequence:>Operational Effects, Delay
Potential Consequence:Immediate Effects, Smoke/Fire Detector Activated
Supporting Statement Statement:
We saw that MEL X was applied and signed of on the #2 engine. Upon further inspection we found the steps needed to be taken to apply the MEL, none of which were completed.